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ABSTRACT 
The usage of unconventional trade protections have been thriving worldwide and 
anti-dumping initiation is one of them. India has appeared the highest initiator of 
anti-dumping in the world during 1995-2010. The paper tries to investigate the 
impact of such initiatives on trade flows and resultant welfare with a particular 
reference to Indian economy. Anti-dumping initiative defends competition, 
protects domestic producers and goes against consumer welfare in general, but 
the strategic initiative may lead to rise in AD-jumping FDI flows, resulting to an 
improvement in domestic welfare. Theoretically, we find that the possibility of 
AD-jumping FDI depends on the foreign price and labour market conditions in 
the domestic economy. Closer to the oligopoly price in the domestic economy 
lower would be the possibility and greater would be a loss of domestic welfare. 
Moreover, in the presence of unions, such possibility goes down.  
The study uses industry and firm level information empirically to see the impact. 
It is observed that the AD initiation does not affect the imports significantly. FDI 
has grown but still very small. The mark-up of AD intensive industries seems to be 
on the higher side and does not support the AD-jumping FDI proposition 
effectively. A large share of Indian initiatives, similar to other countries, has been 
against China and other neighboring countries, leading to rise an issue of 
predatory pricing including the rules of origin applicable largely with them. We 
suggest that AD investigation process should look at (i) the price formation and 
rules of origin in the foreign markets, (ii) the extent of extra-legal employment 
and environmental damage due to the increased import competition. Although 
Indian government has been quite active in taking decision on any petition 
against dumping, the existing laws favour only a small section of producers, do 
not apply uniform methods of injury calculation and do not show any concern 
about labour and environment. We suggest that the safeguard measure should be 
taken up first before using anti-dumping measure in cased of dumping.   
 
Key Words: Anti-Dumping, Welfare, Strategic Trade Policy, AD-jumping FDI, International 
Relation 
JEL Code: F16, F51 
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SECTION 1 
INTRODUCTION 
CONTEXT, PROBLEMS AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Trade policies almost all over the world have transformed from inward oriented and 
protective to more outward and liberal regimes. While traditional trade barriers (e.g., tariff 
and quotas) have declined worldwide, the usage of „unconventional‟ trade protections (e.g., 
antidumping, countervailing and safeguard measures) have been thriving in recent decades. 
This is no longer confined into the developed countries but also has extended to the 
developing economics. WTO has been trying to dismantle and reduce those barriers 
substantially by initiating discussion between partners through international agencies. The 
scholars and policy makers are taking interests to critically examine the implication of such 
practices on the not only domestic economy but also international trade. The recent economic 
crisis in the West has further added on to such initiatives. The increasing volatility in the west 
has forced the most of export-oriented economies including emerging countries to find out 
more stable and large markets elsewhere in the world for their sustainable growth. On the 
other hand, a group of large countries would has a tendency to protect themselves from 
external markets but relies more on direct investments and technology to boost up the 
domestic activities. While the former group would try to promote exports strategically, the 
later one would tend to employ unconventional trade practices to protect them strategically. 
This seems to raise a conflicting relationship between them and restricts the trade flows. The 
current paper investigates the implications of such unconventional trade practices on their 
consumer.  
From the inception in 1945, GATT campaigned against the conventional and unconventional 
trade barriers between the member countries and the initial focus was on the reduction of 
tariff and quotas on tradable commodities. This has been quite successful venture and the 
most of the countries have reduced such barriers substantially during the post-Second World 
War. Since the provision was made for any government that maintained a liberal trade policy 
may impose temporary protection against imports of one or more goods from one or more 
countries under specific conditions. The major forms of such non-tariff barriers include 
custom valuation, import licensing procedures, govt. procurement, product standard, 
technical barriers, countervailing measures, dumping and anti-dumping measures. At first, the 
Kennedy Round (1963-67) under GATT brought some of those Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) 
into the list of withdrawal for their reduction through negotiations between member 
countries. This was not much successful because the major influencing member countries had 
been using such barriers. Then, the Tokyo Round (1973-79) extended the lists and made 
some progress. While all these previous attempts were only modest, the Uruguay Round 
(1986-94) was more ambitious by recommending that all countries joining WTO should 
agree on NTBs reductions. These issues became serious matters of discussion in the national 
policy domain over all the member countries since then. The focus of our study is limited on 
anti-dumping measures. Article VI of the GATT stipulates that „in order to offset or prevent 
dumping a contracting party may levy on any dumped product an antidumping duty not 
greater in amount than the margin of dumping in respect of such countries‟. The most WTO 
member countries have adopted/amended their antidumping legislation largely in accordance 
with the GATT provisions to deal with the dumped imports. Some of the non-members 
countries have also adopted their antidumping legislation. Almost 90% of total world imports 
are now entering countries in which anti-dumping laws are in place (Aggarwal, 2002). 
Moreover, such initiatives are not only limited to the developed countries now-a-days, the 
proliferation of using such measures has been increasingly observed in the developing and 
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emerging countries in recent years. The share of developing countries in total cases was 10% 
at the beginning of the 1990s; it is almost 50% now (Aggarwal, 2002). For example, 
according to the WTO and the Global Antidumping Database (Bown, 2006), India filed 218 
cases during the period 2000-2003 and is currently one of the most intensive users of the AD 
around the world. The need for not only the acceleration of growth but also the promotion of 
development of these emerging and developing countries sets the relevance to look at the 
implication of these measures on the economies.   
The primary purpose behind the provision of Anti-dumping measures was to protect domestic 
industries from awful competition. While some of the existing studies have advocated AD 
duties as a means to protect the domestic industry against stiff foreign competition, others 
have viewed AD as inherently protectionist in nature and going against the tenet of free trade 
and comparative advantage.  A vast number of empirical literature shows that AD initiation 
has an adverse impact on imports (Khatibi, 2009), exports (Konings and Vandenbussche. 
2009) and total factor productivity (Konings and Vandenbussche, 2009). In spite of these 
distortionary effects, the use of anti-dumping has been thriving and one need critically 
examine further intuitions behind these. While investigated the implication of anti-dumping 
initiatives, the scholars largely have been limited to look at the producer activities and 
welfare, and the issues of consumer welfare has been ignored so far. In fact, the practice of 
injury calculation of dumping does not include the welfare aspect of consumer. This has 
prompted us to undertake this study in focusing the issues of consumer welfare with a 
particular reference to India.   
At least, there would be two counteracting forces by which anti-dumping might affect the 
competitiveness and commodity price in the domestic economy. It is easily understood that 
anti-dumping measures give a certain power to the domestic firm. This market power must 
push up the commodity prices and reduces the consumer welfare. On the other hand, the 
hypothesis of tariff-jumping foreign direct investment (FDI) – firms engage in direct 
investment abroad to overcome foreign trade barriers – is fairly well established in the 
international trade literature. The anti-dumping initiatives might work on similar manner and 
help inward flow of FDI in promoting the competitiveness in the domestic industry. These 
two counteracting forces will account for the direction of competitiveness and commodity 
prices. Therefore, the present study will explore the issue of anti-dumping on commodity 
prices and consumer welfare of a domestic country through its effect on competition and FDI 
flow with a special reference to India. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maiti: Anti-Dumping, Competitiveness and Consumer Welfare: A Study on Commodity Prices with A Special Reference to India 
 
 
4 
 
SECTION 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Often in the literature, tariff and anti-dumping tools are considered to be similar protective 
instruments that tend to insulate domestic industries from foreign competition and generate 
revenues to countries that initiate them. However, a tariff is typically designed to maximize 
either domestic revenue or domestic welfare. An anti-dumping duty, on the other hand, is 
usually set to make up for the difference between a foreign firm's price at home and the price 
of its exports, provided that the latter is lower. In other words, an anti-dumping duty serves 
the purpose of industry protection, and also produces revenue as a by-product, but it is not 
designed to maximize protection, revenue, or welfare.  
 The existing literature has traced mainly two types of dumping - price dumping and cost 
dumping. While the former refers to international price discrimination, the latter relates to the 
practice of selling at prices below per unit cost. The provision of antidumping law was put up 
by in the GATT/WTO to deal with the price dumping. There are at least four different 
reasons that an exporter would prefer to dump – predatory, cyclical, seasonal and 
discriminatory. Predatory dumping is intended to drive out rivals. Cyclical dumping occurs 
during an industry downturn in demand, with sales at prices that cover average variable cost 
but are below average total cost. Seasonal dumping unloads excess inventories, especially on 
products that are perishable or going out of fashion. Persistent dumping is a form of 
international price discrimination, with the exporting firm facing a less elastic demand curve 
in the home market, and having some ways to limit or prevent re-import back into its home 
market. Nothing can be done in presence of the last three types. Only when an exporter 
dumps due to predatory reason, an action might to be taken up.  
The major economic justifications for antidumping laws have been that these laws should 
provide protection to the domestic industries from the competitive process and the consumer 
from monopoly power of the foreign exporters (e.g., Viner 1923, Barcelo 1971, Trebilcock 
and John Quinn 1979, Deardorff 1993). Two other protection-based justifications for 
imposing antidumping duties, however, have been discussed by scholars and these include 
optimal tariff argument of protection and strategic trade policy argument. The optimum tariff 
argument suggests that the domestic can derive terms of trade gains from conditional 
protection. On the other hand, the domestic economy would be expected to be experiencing 
positive externalities generated by protecting some sectors in the domestic economy. Critics 
of the antidumping legislation do no subscribe the above-mentioned economic arguments. 
The political economy of protection would provide better explanation behind anti-dumping 
initiatives. The argument suggests that the influential domestic producers over the domestic 
political parties through lobbying determine the antidumping cases (see Tharakan and 
Waelbroeck, 1994, Tharakan 1995). 
Whatever have been the reason behind anti-dumping, it would be important to understand 
actual implication of such initiatives into the economy. Many scholars show that such 
antidumping initiatives have been economically inefficient in many situations (e.g., Hutton 
and Trebilcock, 1990; Hyun Ja Shin 1998; Bourgeoise and Messerlin, 1998; Willig, 1998; 
Leclerc, 1999; Prusa and Skeath 2001). At the same time, the legal provision of antidumping 
has various ambiguities in defining dumping and in calculating injury margin. Therefore, the 
interpretation of such laws widely varies across the countries (see, Murray and Rousslang 
1989, Lindsey 2000, Araujo et. al 2001, Tharakan 1995, Didier 2001, Hsu 1998, Almstedt 
and Norton 2000, Tharakan 1991,1996,1999 Tharakan and Waelbroeck 1994).  
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Antidumping policy is suggested to be a trade policy instrument that, if used appropriately, 
curbs anti-competitive practices by foreign firms by deterring predatory pricing. However, 
charging two or more prices for a like product in two or more markets separated by tariffs, 
transport costs and technical standards, is economically rational in many situations (Deardorff 
1993, Willig 1998). Moreover, an exporter may charge consumers a lower price in foreign 
markets when he introduces a product in a new market to create market for the product 
(Boltuck 1991). Exports at low price might be aimed at developing trade 
connections/increasing market share in new markets. In addition, if a firm produces what 
Deardorff (1993) called „learning by doing‟ products then the firm by charging lower prices 
in foreign markets will gain in experience as well as in the sales revenue obtained. Price 
discrimination in this case may be motivated by steep learning curve for the product. These 
forms of price discrimination are pro-competitive (Warner 1992). Bernhofen (1995) argued 
that price discrimination in these markets arises from differences in country-specific final 
good production costs. The price differential is shown to increase as the productivity 
difference increases. Scholars like Warner (1992) and Willig (1998) argue that in times of 
slack home market demand, an exporter may sell his excess output in export markets with the 
objective of maintaining full capacity. In this case price discrimination is a rational business 
strategy. Clearly, when price discrimination is caused by reasons other than predatory intent 
and is consistent with competitive conditions in the importing market then it can be socially 
beneficial, despite its adverse effects on domestic producers of competing goods (Willig, 
1998; Boltuck, 1991). Domestic consumers benefit from the low prices, and if the importing 
market is perfectly competitive, the benefits to consumers outweigh the losses of domestic 
producers. Price discrimination ought not to be actionable in such cases as it does not violate 
competition laws (Tharakan, 1995 and many others). Antidumping duties are needed only to 
offset the unfair advantage that foreign exporters attempt to derive by charging lower prices 
than would be possible under normal market conditions. Thus, preventing predation is a 
potentially important and beneficial role for antidumping policy (Aggarwal, 2002 and 
reference therein). 
In other paper,  Aggarwal (2007) investigates the industry and firm-level patterns of AD use 
across 18 most active AD user countries and comes out with striking revelations on how only 
a handful of countries of the world and merely a few large and powerful firms in large 
concentrated industries in these countries are asymmetrically benefiting from the AD 
instrument. In contrast, a large segment of the goods producing sector, which is dominated by 
small and medium producers, is not in a position to use this „so-called‟ trade remedial 
instrument.  
In spite of the mentioned well-defined rules, Anti-dumping has hit India hard. The repeated 
EU anti-dumping action has led to a decline in exports of Indian cotton fabrics by 47 per cent 
in volume and 34 per cent in value terms during 1997. This has been reflected in the import 
data maintained by the European Commission. According to an estimate of the Cotton 
Textiles Export Promotion Council, Indian exports have already lost business worth over 
ECU 50 million during 1997 on account of these proceedings. India has retaliated with 13 
cases, many against its major trading partners, while Indian exports have been slammed with 
12 anti-dumping cases since 1993, eight of them by EC (Johri, 1999). Similar to the previous 
studies, Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2007) investigate the effect of AD on bilateral trade 
flows between the new adopters and their trade partners using a gravity model spanning 21 
years (1980-2000) of annual observations and confirms that the AD effects are not small and 
lead to depress the aggregate imports in new users by 21 billion US$ a year (or 8.9%). For 
some developing countries like India and Taiwan, the dampening effects of AD laws on trade 
flows are found to largely offset the gains from trade liberalization.  
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On the other hand, anti-dumping tools thought of strategic trade policies have been 
substantial for the benefits of domestic economy in the recent literature. A study by Dinlersoz 
and Dogan (2010) concludes that, in general, when the foreign demand elasticity is 
sufficiently low, the government prefers the anti-dumping duty both from a revenue and 
protection standpoint, but at the same time the foreign firm may find a duty unfavorable 
compared to a tariff. When the foreign demand elasticity is sufficiently high, on the other 
hand, a revenue-maximizing tariff is favored by both the government and the foreign firm 
over the anti-dumping duty. In addition, when competition is introduced to the foreign 
market, it can be shown that the higher the competition foreign firm faces at home, the less 
attractive is the use of an anti-dumping duty compared to the revenue-maximizing tariff for 
both protection and revenue. 
Using the firm level data, Belderbos et al. (1997) finds that the anti-dumping in the United 
States and the European Union raises the probabilities of FDI substantially. Ray and Pain 
(1999) find evidence of tariff-jumping FDI by Japanese firms in the US and the EU. Girma et 
al. (2002) provide similar results for the U.K. Using data on all US antidumping actions from 
1980 through 1990, Blonigen (2006) finds only a modest level of tariff-jumping in response 
to antidumping investigations. Overall, with the exception of Blonigen (2006), recent 
empirical studies note a substantial tariff-jumping FDI reaction to AD activities.  
Khatibi (2009) empirically studies the effects of European antidumping actions on import 
diversion by using a unique data set at the 8-digit product level. This paper shows that 
although antidumping protection predominantly benefits the EU domestic market rather than 
non-named countries, it is not strong enough to offset the decrease in imports from named 
countries. When EU members reveal a comparative disadvantage, antidumping becomes 
more restrictive for named countries. On the other hand, the analysis provides some evidence 
that intra-EU trade activity becomes more intensive, suggesting that antidumping protection 
is good for disadvantaged products. 
Accroding to Konings and Vandenbussche (2009), while antidumping protection raises the 
domestic sales of the more “traditional” non-exporting firms on the protected market with 
about 5%, it negatively affects the firm-level exports of similar products as the protected 
ones. Export sales of protected firms fall by almost 8% compared to a relevant control group 
of unprotected firms. The drop in firm-level exports more than doubles for firms that are 
global, i.e. firms with foreign affiliates. Protection also affects the extensive margin of 
exporters but to a lesser extent. Moreover, the paper finds that the productivity of exporters 
falls while that of non-exporters rises during antidumping protection.  
Gao and Miyagiwa (2005) investigate theoretically the issue of reciprocal dumping, in which 
firms first engage in cost-reducing R&D and then compete internationally. When one 
government institutes antidumping law the protected firm decreases R&D investment while 
the constrained firm increases its level. When the other government also adopts antidumping 
law, the effects could be reverse. The resultant R&D level could be greater for both firms 
relative to the level under free trade.  
Konings and Vandenbussche (2009) show that Antidumping (AD) Protection can increase 
productivity growth of domestic firms in import-competing industries by identifying a panel 
of domestic firms between 1993 and 2003, which at some point during this period are 
affected by AD initiations. Using a difference-in-difference approach, the authors find that 
AD measures raise Total Factor Productivity (TFP) for protected firms by 1.4 to 12.8% 
depending on the specification used. Moreover, the effect of protection depends on the 
“distance-to-the-frontier firm” in the industry. While protection raises TFP growth of 
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“laggard” domestic firms, it lowers TFP growth for “efficient” firms that operate close to the 
efficiency frontier.  
Another study by Marsh (1998) investigates whether anti-dumping statutes are effective at 
improving the performance of U.S. firms. As international trade grows and competitors 
increasingly cross national borders to enter new markets, U.S. trade law becomes a 
potentially important tool for managers as they consider how to create barriers for foreign 
competitors. The results of this study suggest that the anti-dumping laws significantly 
increase returns of U.S. firms that pursue anti-dumping protection. The average petitioner 
between 1980 and 1992 received a $46 million increase in market value as a result of filing 
an anti-dumping petition. However, no significant change in market value was associated 
with preliminary or final determinations of the International Trade Commission, except when 
petitions received a negative determination at the final stage of the process. A negative 
determination/ruling by the ITC at the final stage of the process resulted in a loss of market 
value. The study invoked the assumption of efficient market hypothesis and used OLS 
estimation technique. 
A set of studies were carried out to gauge the extent of protection granted by anti-dumping 
laws in Indian scenario which concluded that not much is achieved though the AD statuettes. 
For example, in context of Vitamin C industry in India, although AD was pretty much 
effective in restricting imports from countries which were named to be dumping, there was 
also strong evidence of imports being diverted away from named source countries to non-
named countries. Moreover, imposition of AD on named countries led to influx of new 
entrants catering to Vitamin C imports for India. This significantly mitigates the restrictive 
effect of AD law. This case study also highlights the possibility of abuse of AD law by the 
domestic industry unless the national authorities step in to plug the inconsistencies (Gulati et 
al. 2005). 
The effect on Anti-dumping on the consumer welfare through AD-jumping FDI is still under-
researched. The paper intends to address this issue both theoretically and empirically. 
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SECTION 3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Using a simple framework, this exercise attempts to examine the implication of AD initiation 
on the choice of importing and FDI as well as its resultant implication on the domestic and 
consumer welfare. When perfect competition prevails in the product markets, the AD 
initiation would not be an important concern for domestic economy. So, this issue is very 
much related to the market where competition does not prevail. We consider most simple 
cases (i.e., monopoly and duopoly case) to examine the implication of strategic anti-dumping 
initiative on the choice of the foreign firm between importing and FDI. Since the product 
market competition transmit to the factor market as well, the forms of labour market 
condition in the domestic economy (e.g., unionized or non-unionized) would also affect the 
choice. Theoretically, those two things will be handled separately.   
3.1 Domestic Economy without union 
Monopoly Case: 
Suppose a domestic firm produces a single good as a monopolist. We consider that q is the 
output and w is the fixed wage to be paid to the workers. If the firm faces demand as 
qap  , and we can write the profit function of domestic firm: 
qwqa )(           (1) 
The firm chooses q from this equation.  
2
wa
qMN


          (2) 
2
wa
pMN


          (3) 
Therefore, the profit of the firm and consumer surplus (CS) and domestic welfare can be 
derived as follows: 
2
2





 

wa
MN
         (4) 
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

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
 

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         (5) 
2
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8
)(3 2 wawwa
SMN




       (6)  
Since, workers receive subsistence wage, the wage bill is simply the product of employment 
and wage.   
Importing: 
Let us assume that the firm imports to the domestic economy and plays cournot game with 
the domestic firm. Under cournot game, the foreign firm imports 2q  and incurs cost t per unit 
to production and distribution of the outputs in the domestic economy and there is no other 
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trade cost in the domestic economy. Given the demand function 21; qqqqap  , the 
domestic and foreign firms respectively supply 1q  and 2q  so that they maximize their 
respective profits, 1211 )( qwqqa   and 2212 )( qtqqa  .  
Hence we find,  
3
2
1
wta
qIN


                   (7) 
3
2
2
wta
qIN


                   (8) 
3
wta
pIN


                   (9) 
The foreign firm imports if 2
wa
t


. Therefore, the profit of the firm, consumer surplus 
(CS) and domestic welfare (S) can be derived as follows: 
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FDI: 
If the foreign faces anti-dumping measure against importing, the foreign firm might think of 
investing directly to the economy and use the domestic workers. Then the foreign firm will 
play cournot game with the domestic firm. If the domestic and foreign firms respectively 
produce 1q and 2q  and face demand function qap  (where 21 qqq  ) , the profit 
functions of domestic and foreign firm are respectively 1211 )( qwqqa   and 
2212 )( qwqqa  .  
Hence we find,  
3
21
wa
qq FNFN


                   (13) 
3
2wa
pFN


                   (14) 
Therefore, the profit of the firm, consumer surplus (CS), union utility (U) and domestic 
welfare (S) can be derived as follows: 
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2
1
3





 

wa
FN
                   (15) 
2
39
2





 

wa
CS FN
                   (16) 
 2
3
1
waSFN 
                            (17) 
Lemma: When 2
wa
t


, (i) 1INMN
 
 (ii) 
11 FNIN 


 if 
wt


(iii) 1INMN
CSCS 
(iv) 
11 FNIN CSCS


 if 
wt


(v) 1INMN
SS 
 (vi) 
11 FNIN SS


 if 
wt


 
Proof: See Above 
Lemma 2: When 2
wa
t


, (i) 22 INFN
 
 if 
wt


 
Proof: See Above 
 
Proposition 1: In absence of anti-dumping, (i) both profit of domestic producer and total 
domestic welfare are higher in case of FDI while the domestic consumer prefer foreign 
imports when wt  . (ii) The foreign firms prefer imports than FDI when wt  .  
Proof: See above 
Proposition 2: The strategic anti-dumping initiative is beneficial for the domestic economy 
when the foreign price lies between 2
wa 
and 3
2wa 
, (i) If the foreign firm sells at the 
domestic economy lower than w , this would be harmful to the domestic economy.  
Proof: See above 
When foreign price is higher than the domestic price, the foreign firm cannot import because 
of threat of anti-dumping. Even, the foreign price lies between monopoly and oligopoly, the 
firm will be forced to go for FDI. Because, any price in between these two will be unstable 
because of the presence of competition. FDI would be beneficial because of a rise of 
consumer surplus as well as employment generation. However, if the foreign firm sells at 
lower than competitive price (i.e., w ), the domestic producer will stop production and this 
will be harmful to the domestic economy. 
3.2 Domestic Economy with union 
If the domestic economy faces trade union, the result could be different. The form of trade 
union could be two types – centralized and decentralized union. 
Monopoly Case: 
Suppose a domestic firm produces a single good as a monopolist and faces a union in the 
labour market. We consider that q is the output and w is the union wage to be paid to the 
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union workers. The game is structured as follows: at stage 1 the trade union solves the 
equilibrium wage and at stage 2, the firm chooses q . It is solved by backward induction 
method. If the firm faces demand as qap  , and we can write the profit function of the 
domestic firm: 
qwqa )(                   (18) 
The firm chooses q from this equation. If the „right-to-manage‟ production is the strategy of 
trade union and one union worker is assumed to be produced one unit of output, the utility 
function of union can be written as: qwwU )(  . w is minimum wage available in the 
economy. Substitution q derived from (18), one would be able to solve w easily. Therefore, 
the equilibrium wage, employment and price can be derived as follows:  
2
wa
wMU


                 (19) 
4
wa
qMU


                  (20) 
4
3 wa
pMU


                  (21) 
Therefore, the profit of the firm, consumer surplus (CS), wage bills (W) and domestic welfare 
(S) can be derived as follows: 
2
4





 

wa
MU
                (22) 
2
42
1





 

wa
CS MU
                  (23) 
16
))(( wawa
WMU


              (24) 
32
)5)(( wawa
SMU


              (25)  
Let assume that the price of foreign producer in the host country is Fp . Then, the following 
statements can be written: 
Lemma 3: The foreign firm prefers to import to the domestic economy only when 
4
3 wa
pF


. (ii) The domestic firm will shut down production when wpF   
Proof: When 4
3 wa
pF


, no one will buy from foreign importers. In this case, if the 
foreign firm levies a price below than this, it is subjected to anti-dumping measure. We shall 
examine in the next section whether the relaxation of such initiative would be beneficial.  
On the other hand, when wpF  , the domestic firm will shut down production and foreign 
producer would eventually appear as a monopolist in the domestic market.  
Maiti: Anti-Dumping, Competitiveness and Consumer Welfare: A Study on Commodity Prices with A Special Reference to India 
 
 
12 
 
Importing: 
Let us assume that the firm imports and two options are available for the domestic producers 
– collude with the foreign importers or play non-cooperative game (i.e., cournot game). 
Since, sharing of monopoly profit between them cannot be better than the cournot solution, 
the domestic firm would not be interested to collude even though the foreign firm would like 
to do.  
Under the cournot game, the foreign firm imports 2q  and incurs cost t per unit for production 
and distribution relating to the trade in the domestic economy. Given the demand function 
qap  , the domestic and foreign firms respectively supply 1q  and 2q  so that the 
maximize their respective profits, 1211 )( qwqqa   and 2212 )( qtqqa  .  
The union in the domestic economy solves wage in the stage 1 and both firms solves outputs 
in the next state. The solution involves backward induction method. Hence we find,  
4
2wta
wIU


        (26) 
6
2
1
wta
qIU


                   (27) 
12
275
2
wta
q IU


                   (28) 
12
255 wta
pIU


                   (29) 
Therefore, the profit of the firm, consumer surplus (CS), union utility (U) and domestic 
welfare (S) can be derived as follows: 
2
1
6
2





 

wta
IU
 and 
2
2
12
275





 

wta
IU
              (30) 
2
12
257
2
1





 

wta
CS IU
                          (31) 
24
)2)(2( wtawta
WIU


                 (32) 
24
)2)(2(
12
257
2
1
6
2
22
wtawtawtawta
S IU






 





 

           (33) 
Lemma 4: (i) the foreign firm imports if 
*)(
7
25
t
wa
t 


 
Proof: See equation (30) 
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FDI with Centralised Union: 
If the foreign firm faces anti-dumping initiative against importing, the foreign firm might 
think of investing to the domestic economy. Then they will play cournot game in the 
domestic economy. Assume that both firm face union. So, union will first determine wage 
and then both firms solve their respective productions. If the domestic and foreign firms 
respectively produce 1q and 2q  and face demand function qap  (where 21 qqq  ) , the 
profit functions of domestic and foreign firm are respectively 11211 )( qwqqa   and 
22212 )( qwqqa  .  
The union in the domestic economy solves wage in the stage 1 and both firms solves outputs 
in the next state. The solution involves backward induction method. Hence we find,  
2
wa
wFC


         (34) 
6
21
wa
qq FCFC


        (35) 
3
2 wa
pFC


        (36) 
Therefore, the profit of the firm, consumer surplus (CS), union utility (U) and domestic 
welfare (S) can be derived as follows: 
2
21
6





 

wa
FCFCFC 
      (37) 
2
3





 

wa
CS FC
                   (38) 
3
))(( wawa
WFC


       (39) 
 
36
)717( wawa
SFC


                             (40) 
 
FDI with Decentralised Union: 
The respective unions in the domestic economy solve wages decentrally at stage 1 and both 
firms solves outputs in the next state. The solution involves backward induction method. 
Hence we find,  
3
2
21
wa
ww FDFD


        (41) 
9
)(2
21
wa
qq FDFD


                   (42) 
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9
45 wa
pFD


                  (43) 
Therefore, the profit of the firm, consumer surplus (CS), union utility (U) and domestic 
welfare (S) can be derived as follows: 
2
11
9
)(2





 

wa
FDFD 
                  (44) 
2
9
)(4
2
1





 

wa
CS FD
                   (45) 
27
)2)((4 wawa
WFC


                  (46) 
  )2(
27
4
wawaSFC 
                            (47) 
Lemma 5: When *tt  , (i) MUFCIU
www 
 (ii) FDIU
ww 
if 7
25
3
2 wa
t
wa 


 (iii) 
MUFCFDIU PPPP   
Proof: See above 
Lemma 6: When *tt  (i)  MUIU
qq 
, (ii) FCIU
qq 
 if wt  , (iii) FDIU
qq 
 if 2
2wa
t


 
Proof: See above 
Lemma 6: When *tt  , (i)  MUIU
CSCS 
, if wt   (ii) FCIU
CSCS 
 if wtt  and 
0* tt (iii) FDIU
CSCS 
 if 15
613 wa
t


 
Proof: See above 
Lemma 7: When *tt  ,(i)  MUIU
 1 , (ii) FCIU
 1  if wt  , (iii) FDIU
 1  if 
2
2wa
t


 
Proof: See above 
Lemma 8: When *tt  , (i)  FCIU
 2 , if 7
43 wa
t


(ii) FDIU
 2  if 2
2wa
t


 
Proof: See above 
Lemma 9: When *tt  ,(i)  MUIU
SS 1 , if 7
43 wa
t


(ii) FCIU
SS 1  (iii) 
FDIU SS


1
(iv) FDMU
SS 
 
Proof: See above 
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Proposition 3: In absence of anti-dumping, when the domestic economy is unionized (i) the 
foreign firm would prefer to import unless t is too high (ii) the domestic welfare is not 
unambiguously higher in case of FDI than importing.  
Proof: See above 
Proposition 4: In the presence of union, the strategic dumping cannot unambiguously 
increase FDI and domestic welfare.  
Proof: See above 
In the presence of union, the domestic price would be higher because of higher production 
cost. This will discourage the foreign firm to FDI compared to importing. Therefore, the 
strategic dumping would be beneficial or not, even if you ignore consumer surplus, depends 
on the labour market condition in the domestic economy. The consumer would be really 
better off in the absence of union. The union raises welfare workers but distorts the consumer 
interests, making ambiguity of the effect of strategic use of AD initiative.  
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SECTION 4 
ANTI-DUMPING AND LEGAL PROVISION IN INDIA 
Although anti dumping duty is levied and collected by the Customs Authorities, it is entirely 
different from the Customs duties not only in concept and substance, but also in purpose and 
operation (DGAD, 2005). The following are the main differences between the two:  
 The object of AD duties is to guard against the situation arising out of unfair trade 
practices while customs duties are there as a means of raising revenue and for overall 
development of the economy.  
 Customs duties fall in the realm of trade and fiscal policies of the Government while 
anti dumping and anti subsidy measures are there as trade remedial measures.  
 The object of anti dumping and allied duties is to offset the injurious effect of 
international price discrimination while customs duties have implications for the 
government revenue and for overall development of the economy.  
 Anti-dumping duties are not necessarily in the nature of a tax measure inasmuch as 
the Authority is empowered to suspend these duties in case of an exporter offering a 
price undertaking. Thus such measures are not always in the form of duties/tax.  
Anti dumping and anti subsidy duties are levied against exporter / country inasmuch as they 
are country specific and exporter specific as against the customs duties which are general and 
universally applicable to all imports irrespective of the country of origin and the exporter. 
A gamut of reasons can be adduced to dumping – motive of dumper, continuity of dumping, 
the dumper‟s cost structure etc. The current classification is based on motive of the dumper. 
In general, two major grounds for dumping can be traced: those that aim to amass a market 
share in the export market and those that are based on business reasons – meeting 
competition in export market or discharging excess capacity. The following reasons are set by 
the Indian government for the prevalence of dumping. 
Dumping for Business Reasons: 
 Sporadic (Over-Capacity) Dumping: It implies selling products at low prices to 
dispose excess capacity. A firm releases excess stock in 3 alternatives: disposing off 
the excess stock in another season, reducing price in standard market to enhance sales 
and dumping the excess stock in foreign market. Storage expense and possibility of 
change in consumer tastes renders the 1
st
 alternative unattractive. Price reduction in 
standard market may not be workable as it may be difficult to re-establish the original 
price after its reduction or due to inelastic demand rendering price reduction 
ineffective. Thus, the only viable alternative is the 3
rd
, viz; dumping in an 
international market.  
 Meeting the Competition: In some cases, exporting firms may need to lower their 
prices in the more contested market of the importing country in order to be able to 
compete.  
 Price discrimination (PD) to increase profits: For PD to succeed, arbitrage possibility 
must not exist – i.e. re-exporting products from the less expensive to the more 
expensive market of the exporter. Market segregation due to high transport costs, 
different product specifications, demand elasticity and tariffs/non-tariff barriers – is 
an important factor in carrying out PD (provided there exists imperfect competition in 
the home market). 
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 Miscellaneous: Other business reasons may include promotional prices that are 
associated with entering a new market. Industries characterized by peak demand 
periods, such as the cut flower industry, often set prices below full cost during down 
season and above cost during high demand periods. 
Strategic Dumping: 
 Dumping to gain or increase market share: Firms can deliberately dump their 
products to gain or increase market share in the importing country‟s market. In some 
cases, firms deliberately produce at artificially high capacity to dump excess product 
in a foreign country. This is different from sporadic dumping as in the 1
st
 case. It is 
distinguishable from predatory pricing in that in gaining market share may be normal 
method of competition and does not involve gaining dominant market share.  
 Predatory Dumping: It refers to price discrimination aimed at driving competitors out 
of market or bringing them to terms. A closed home market or government subsidies 
may finance the low-priced imports. When competition in the home market is 
destroyed, the predator then controls the market of the importing country and can reap 
monopoly profits. In reality, however, predatory dumping is unlikely to occur in 
practice.  
Legal Provision: 
Dumping is said to have taken place when an exporter sells a product to the importing 
country at a price less than the price prevailing in its domestic market. This is an unfair trade 
practice which can have a distortionary effect on international trade. Anti-dumping is a 
remedial measure to rectify the situation arising out of the dumping of goods and its trade 
distortive effect – so as to reestablish fair trade. It provides relief to the domestic industry 
against the injury caused by dumping. 
Dumping thus threatens to cause material injury to the domestic producers of the 
importing/host country (say here India) and the Designated Authority, Ministry of Commerce 
initiates investigation and subsequent imposition of anti-dumping duties, although some 
consumers may benefit from dumping by being able to purchase the dumped „like product‟ 
(the dumped product has a corresponding like-product produced domestically) at rock-bottom 
prices. 
The legal framework of AD is based on Article VI of GATT 1994, Customs Tariff Act, 1975 - 
Sec 9A, 9B (as amended in 1995 and Anti-Dumping Rules [Customs Tariff (Identification, 
Assessment and Collection of Anti Dumping Duty on Dumped Articles and for 
Determination of Injury) Rules. Although, the investigations and recommendations with 
respect to AD is undertaken by the Directorate General of Anti dumping and Allied Duties 
(DGAD), Ministry of Commerce, headed by the Designated Authority, the imposition and 
collection is done by the Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance. 
Dumping occurs when the export price of goods imported into India is less than the Normal 
Value (The price at which like articles are sold in the domestic market of the exporter) of 
„like articles‟ sold in the domestic market of the exporter. Normal value is the comparable 
price at which the goods under complaint are sold, in the ordinary course of trade, in the 
domestic market of the exporting country. If the normal value cannot be determined by 
means of the domestic sales, the following two alternative methods may be employed to 
determine the normal value: (i) comparable representative export price to an appropriate third 
country, and (ii) constructed normal value, i.e. the cost of production in the country of origin 
with reasonable addition for administrative, selling and general costs and reasonable profits.  
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The export price of the goods allegedly dumped into India means the price at which it is 
exported to India. It is generally the CIF value minus the adjustments on account of ocean 
freight, insurance, commission, etc. so as to arrive at the value at ex-factory level. 
The dumping margin is the difference between the Normal value and the export price of the 
goods under complaint. It is generally expressed as a percentage of the export price. Or, 
Margin of Dumping = Normal Value of the like article – Export price of the product. Anti-
dumping action can be taken only when there is an Indian Industry producing „like articles‟ 
when compared to the allegedly dumped „imported products‟. 
For AD initiations to be filed, a „causal link‟ must be established between the material injury 
suffered by the Indian industry and the dumped imports. The extent of injury may be 
evaluated in terms of deterioration of certain actual/potential economic indicators of the 
domestic industry viz. sales, output, profits, market-share, productivity, return on investment, 
capacity utilization, employment, stocks/inventories, and ability to raise capital/investment 
and so on. 
A dumping investigation can normally be initiated only upon receipt of a written application 
by or on behalf of the “Domestic Industry” subject to two conditions: 
The domestic producers expressly supporting the application must account for: (i) not less 
than 25% of domestic production of like article, and (ii) more than 50% of total production of 
like article by those expressly supporting and those opposing the application.  
Under Indian laws, GOI imposes AD duty= minimum [Dumping Margin, Injury Margin]. 
The Designated Authority also calculates the Injury Margin which is the difference between 
fair selling price due to domestic industry and the landed cost of the product under 
consideration. 
Any exporter whose dumping margin is less than 2% of export price is excluded from AD 
duties even if existence of dumping, injury and causal link are established. Also, if volume of 
dumped imports from source country are less than 3% of total imports, provided cumulative 
imports from all those countries who individually account for less than 3%, are not more than 
7%, cannot be penalized with AD duties. 
An Application received by the Designated Authority is dealt with in the following manner: 
A. Preliminary Screening: The application is scrutinized to ensure that it is fully 
documented and provides sufficient evidence for initiating an investigation. If the 
evidence is not adequate, then a deficiency letter is issued. Unless the deficiencies are 
rectified, the submission made before the Authority cannot be construed as an 
application pending before the Authority. 
B. Initiation: Designated Authority determines that the application has been made by or 
on behalf of the Domestic Industry. It also examines the accuracy and adequacy of the 
evidence provided in the application and when satisfied that there is sufficient evidence 
regarding dumping, injury and causal link, a public notice is issued initiating an 
investigation. The Initiation notice will be issued normally within 5 days from the date 
of receipt of a properly documented application. 
C. Access to Information: The Authority provides access to the non-confidential evidence 
presented to it by various interested parties in the form of a public file, which is 
available for inspection to all interested parties on request after receipt of the responses. 
D. Preliminary Findings: The Designated Authority will proceed expeditiously with the 
conduct of the investigation and shall, in appropriate cases, make a preliminary finding 
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containing the detailed information on the main reasons behind the determination. The 
preliminary finding will normally be made within 60-70 days from the date of initiation. 
E. Provisional Duty: A provisional duty not exceeding the margin of dumping may be 
imposed by the Central Government on the basis of the preliminary finding recorded by 
the Designated Authority. The provisional duty can be imposed only after the expiry of 
60 days from the date of initiation of investigation. The provisional duty will remain in 
force only for a period not exceeding 6 months, extendable to 9 months under certain 
circumstances. 
F. Oral Evidence & Public Hearing: Interested parties who participate in the 
investigations can request the Designated Authority for an opportunity to present the 
relevant information orally. However, such oral information shall be taken into 
consideration only when it is subsequently reproduced in writing. The Authority may 
grant oral hearing anytime during the course of the investigation. Besides the above, the 
Authority holds a public hearing inviting all interested parties to make their submissions 
before it. All oral submissions made during the hearing need to be reproduced in writing 
for the Authority to take the same on board. 
G. Disclosure of information: Based on these submissions and evidence gathered during 
the investigation and verification thereof, the Authority will determine the basis of its 
final findings. However, the Designated Authority will inform all interested parties of 
the essential facts, which form the basis for its decision before the final finding is made. 
H. Final Determination: The interested parties submit their response to the disclosure and 
the final position of the Authority taken therein. The Authority examines these final 
submissions of the parties and comes out with final findings. 
I. Time-limit for Investigation Process: Normal time allowed by the statute for 
conclusion of investigation and submission of final findings is one year from the date of 
initiation of the investigation. The above period may be extended by the Central 
Government by 6 months. The anti dumping duty shall remain in force for a period of 
five years from the date of imposition of duty. However, such duty can be reviewed by 
the Designated Authority anytime before the expiry of the said period. 
 The Authority has the power to review the need for continuation of anti dumping 
duty. Such a review can be done on the basis of a request received from an 
interested party in view of the changed circumstances.  
 The review may result in the withdrawal of the duty or in the variation of the duty 
level depending upon the new circumstances. Generally speaking, an interested 
party can file a request for review only after a year from the imposition of duty.  
 A review shall follow the same procedure as prescribed for investigation of a fresh 
case to the extent applicable.  
Normally speaking, the Designated Authority initiates the proceedings for anti dumping 
action on the basis of a petition received from the domestic industry alleging dumping of 
certain goods and the injury caused to it by such dumping. However, Rule 5(4) of the Anti 
Dumping Rules provides for suo-motu initiation of anti dumping proceedings by the 
Designated Authority on the basis of information received from the Collector of Customs 
appointed under the Customs Act, 1962 or from any other source. Some exceptions to AD 
duties include products imported by units in EPZs and 100% EOUs, Advance Licence 
Holders etc. 
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Ambiguity in AD Laws: 
Although the anti-dumping laws in India has been quite detailed and to some extent liberal, 
still it carries some criticisms.  
 There is no clear cut method of injury calculation due to dumping. It applies some 
arbitrary method depending on the case. It is subjected to the judgment of the 
undertaking officers.  
 Consumer welfare has been widely ignored from injury calculation. 
 It does not look at the distortionary effect of labour conditions and environmental 
conditions. 
 The existing AD law has some contradictory with the Competition Laws in the 
country.  
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SECTION 5 
ANTI-DUMPING INITIATIVES BY COUNTRY 
In view of the various reasons that render dumping lucrative and highly probable, more so, in 
post WTO era of phased out QRs and lowered tariff rates, AD initiations and measures have 
become the order of the day. Moreover, increased AD activities are being considered by the 
developing countries too – they are no longer a prerogative of a handful of Developed 
countries like the USA or the EU. In what follows, we shall examine the worldwide AD 
trends and look specifically at India‟s relative position. 
Let us first look at the pace and pattern of anti-dumping initiatives across countries during 
1995-2010. The world economy has been increasingly facing anti-dumping initiatives and 
while it was 157 in 1995, the number of initiatives reached to a pick of 372 in 2001 and then 
came down to 170 in 2010 (Table 1). In other words, the number of annual initiatives went 
upto more than 300 during the early 2000, it accounts for roughly 200 and more. The number 
of initiatives registers a declining trend. This could be partial success of the discussion 
initiated in the Doha round.  
In terms of total figure during 1995-2010, the top ten initiators have been respectively - India, 
USA, EU, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, South Africa, China, Canada and Turkey. They 
account for 2914 out of 3854 initiatives, capturing more than three-fourth in the world during 
the above-mentioned period. It is interesting to be noted that top ten initiators include 
countries those from both developed and developing countries who have been sharply 
growing in recent years.  Except Russia, all other countries in BRICs have been in the list. 
Notably, these countries are large in size and they have large domestic demand. Therefore, 
the countries who are large in size and have strong domestic demand have been frequent 
users of anti-dumping initiative.  
TABLE 1 
Number of AD initiations by the member countries during 1995-2010 
Reporting 
Member 1
9
9
5
 
1
9
9
6
 
1
9
9
7
 
1
9
9
8
 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
0
9
 
2
0
1
0
 
T
o
ta
l 
India 6 21 13 28 64 41 79 81 46 21 28 35 47 55 31 41 637 
United 
States 
14 22 15 36 47 47 77 35 37 26 12 8 28 16 20 3 443 
European 
Union 
33 25 41 22 65 32 28 20 7 30 24 35 9 19 15 15 420 
Argentina 27 22 14 8 23 43 28 14 1 12 12 11 8 19 28 14 284 
Australia 5 17 44 13 24 15 24 16 8 9 7 11 2 6 9 7 217 
Brazil 5 18 11 18 16 11 17 8 4 8 6 12 13 23 9 37 216 
South 
Africa 
16 34 23 41 16 21 6 4 8 6 23 3 5 3 3 
 
212 
China    
3 2 11 14 30 22 27 24 10 4 14 17 8 186 
Canada 11 5 14 8 18 21 25 5 15 11 1 7 1 3 6 2 153 
Turkey   
4 1 8 7 15 18 11 25 12 8 6 23 6 2 146 
Sub-group 
total 
117 164 179 178 283 249 313 231 159 175 149 140 123 181 144 129 2914 
rest of 
world 
40 62 67 88 75 49 59 84 75 45 52 64 42 32 65 41 940 
Total 157 226 246 266 358 298 372 315 234 220 201 204 165 213 209 170 3854 
Source: WTO 
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FIGURE 1 
Number of AD initiations by sectors in the World during 1995-2010 
 
Source: WTO 
Let us look at the distribution of AD initiatives by industry types in the world during 1995-
2010. Base metals and articles received 1050 number of anti-dumping initiatives which 
account for almost one-fourth of total initiatives in the world during 1995-2010. Other 
important sectors which received sufficient number of anti-dumping initiatives have been 
respectively products of the chemichels and allied products (796); resins, plastics and articles, 
rubber products (500); machinery and electrical equipments (341). These are mainly 
chemicals and heavy engineering materials and large items of such sectors are used as 
intermediate goods. This apart, textile which produce mass consumption goods also received 
301 number of AD initiatives during the same period (see Figure 1).  
 AD initiative sectors in India has been chemicals and allied products (274); resins, plastics 
and rubber products (94); base metal products (87). Whereas other countries showed a 
general tendency to impose AD initiatives more on base metals, followed by chemicals and 
allied products, resins-plastics-rubber products and textiles (see Table 2).  
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TABLE 2 
Number of AD initiations reported by the member countries for  
top ten countries by sectors 
HS Sector India 
United 
States 
European 
Union 
Argentina Brazil Australia 
South 
Africa 
China Canada Turkey 
Rest 
of 
World 
I 
 
15 7 3 5 
 
3 1 
  
20 
II 
 
13 3 
 
1 7 2 1 7 
 
22 
III 1 
    
2 2 
   
9 
IV 
 
8 1 3 1 7 
 
1 9 
 
24 
V 9 8 3 1 7 5 
 
4 
  
34 
VI 274 65 82 33 41 25 30 105 5 12 144 
VII 94 37 35 20 58 62 37 39 2 44 78 
VIII 
  
4 
       
1 
IX 5 3 9 7 1 7 2 
 
9 6 30 
X 14 14 1 13 13 26 17 12 5 
 
82 
XI 65 14 43 24 17 7 11 4 
 
39 77 
XII 1 
 
9 1 1 
 
1 
 
7 
 
12 
XIII 13 4 7 12 7 17 26 
 
3 6 51 
XIV 
          
1 
XV 87 237 145 81 49 40 58 11 100 23 240 
XVI 76 26 57 59 9 7 13 1 3 7 87 
XVII 3 5 9 10 
 
4 2 2 
 
1 4 
XVIII 3 
 
1 11 4 1 8 5 
 
1 14 
XIX 
          
0 
XX 2 3 12 10 13 2 1 
 
3 8 32 
Total 647 452 428 288 227 219 213 186 153 147 962 
Source: WTO 
Let us look at the distribution of AD initiatives by country against the exporting countries. 
Out of 647 AD initiatives, India imposed 144 against the industries from mainland China 
(22%) and 201 (31%) against the countries including other Chinese parts (e.g., Hong Kong, 
Taipei). So, a large number of AD initiated by India goes against Chinese products. This is 
true for other reporting countries as well. Out of 3922, China received 825 (i.e., 21%) from 
all the countries in the world.  So, the immediate question is - why do most of the countries 
impose AD against Chinese industries? China is highest exported in the world during almost 
one decade because of producing various competitive goods at cheaper prices. Growth of 
exports has played a significant role in promoting Chinese growth and therefore, promotion 
of exports has been important policy to maintain long-term growth. Perhaps, often it dumps 
other market strategically to expand their market in the long-run. Chinese firms do not face 
labour disputes and strict environmental laws and these have helped to be more competitive 
in the world market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maiti: Anti-Dumping, Competitiveness and Consumer Welfare: A Study on Commodity Prices with A Special Reference to India 
 
 
24 
 
TABLE 3 
Distribution of AD initiatives reported by member countries against exporting countries 
during 1995-2011 
 
Reported Country 
Exporting Country 
In
d
ia
 
U
n
it
ed
 S
ta
te
s 
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 U
n
io
n
 
A
rg
en
ti
n
a
 
A
u
st
ra
li
a
 
B
ra
zi
l 
S
o
u
th
 A
fr
ic
a
 
C
h
in
a
 
C
a
n
a
d
a
 
T
u
rk
ey
 
T
o
ta
l 
Argentina 
 
5 
   
10 1 
 
1 
 
35 
Australia 2 3 2 2 
 
2 5 
   
24 
Belgium 2 2 
  
4 3 5 1 2 1 26 
Brazil 7 10 4 49 3 
 
9 
 
6 1 112 
Canada 5 15 1 1 5 2 
 
1 
 
1 38 
China 144 106 102 85 31 48 33 
 
26 58 825 
European Union 48 
  
1 
 
5 
 
15 
 
1 85 
Hong Kong, China 10 
 
3 
 
1 1 8 
 
1 2 28 
India 
 
22 33 10 4 11 21 4 5 9 153 
Indonesia 25 18 13 6 21 4 9 5 3 9 161 
Iran, Islamic Republic of 13 
 
3 
 
2 
 
1 1 
 
1 22 
Japan 32 33 9 4 7 2 1 31 2 2 162 
Korea, Republic of 49 30 28 13 22 9 15 31 8 7 278 
Malaysia 22 5 17 3 12 
 
8 4 2 6 102 
Russian Federation 19 11 19 4 1 5 2 11 5 3 123 
Singapore 23 1 2 
 
5 
 
1 6 
  
46 
South Africa 10 16 4 10 4 3 
 
1 5 
 
59 
Spain 4 8 
 
6 2 4 7 
 
2 
 
47 
Taipei, Chinese 47 23 24 11 10 7 11 16 8 9 207 
Thailand 37 10 20 5 20 5 5 4 2 10 158 
Turkey 6 8 12 2 
 
2 4 
 
3 
 
51 
Ukraine 11 7 13 2 
 
1 1 1 4 2 65 
United Kingdom 3 5 
 
2 6 6 7 3 3 
 
44 
United States 33 
 
14 13 11 33 9 32 17 2 228 
Viet Nam 4 4 6 2 
    
3 4 28 
Total 647 452 428 288 219 227 213 186 153 147 3922 
Source: WTO 
Second, another important feature is that 312 of Indian initiatives have been against 
neighboring countries (including Thailand, Malayasia, Singapore, Viet Num etc.) which 
constitutes almost 50% of total initiatives. So, India shows a trend of imposing AD mostly 
against neighboring countries. This can be also observed Latin Americans countries where 
larger share of Agentina‟s initiatives have been against Brazil. Similarly, China have initiated 
against Japan and Korea to a large extent. The reason is as follows: a firm would likely to sell 
at lower cost in the neighbouring country due to low transportation costs when the traditional 
trade barriers go down. This apart, the political and historical relationships between any two 
neighbouring countries have always been complex. Perhaps, these would explain the more 
intensive use of unconventional barriers, like AD initiatives, between them to a large extent.  
 
 
 
 SANEI Working Paper Series 
No. 12 - 07 
 
25 
 
SECTION 6 
ANTI-DUMPING INITIATIVES IN INDIA 
During the last two decades, India witnesses gradual removals of trade and industrial 
restrictions. It was initiated in the late 1980s and pursed vigorously from early 1990s when 
the country faced severe crisis of foreign exchange reserves coupled with high inflation. The 
strategy of import substitution pursued during initial year of planning (1950s to early 1980s) 
had been withdrawn. The tariff rates were very high during pre-1991 and reached at the 
highest level, accounting more than 100% in the year 1985. Then it declined gradually 
thereafter to 79.2% in 1991 to 12.5% in 2006. Currently, the average tariff rate has been less 
than 10%. Similarly, import quotas and limits have almost withdrawn from all economic 
sectors except exceptional case. The reforms were adopted in intending an improvement of 
the efficiency, productivity, and competitiveness in the Indian industry. The economy started 
showing an improvement of the growth sooner after that and has moved from low level to a 
level closer to two digits. According to World Bank Development Indicator, while GDP grew 
roughly at 5% during the latter half of 1980s, it reaches upto 9.7% in 2010.  Many scholars 
have shown that this trade liberalization has contributed substantially to the growth process.  
On the other hand, the increasing of economic growth coupled with other development 
programme has contributed to reduce the poverty level in the country substantially. 
According to the head-count poverty ratio based on the national poverty line, the poverty 
(both rural and urban) has declined from 45.7% in 1983 to 27.5% in 2004. Per capita GDP 
has also increased from 264.8 US$ in 1985 marginally to 318.4 US$ in 1990 and then sharply 
to 829.7US$ 2010 at 2000 base price. This has created huge additional demand in the 
economy and this addition from large populated country has essentially attracted international 
producers and traders. 
One of the critical problems discussed by many scholars even within this success is that the 
country does not register a notable growth of gainful and decent employment. The economic 
growth without much employment in the formal sector is defined as „jobless growth‟ 
phenomenon in India (Nagaraj, 2004) and has been causing a threat of sustainability. The 
contribution of secondary sector in the GDP has been still low and has gone up marginally 
from 26.1% in 1985 to 28.4% in 2010. This is so in the employment figure. According to the 
Census data, the work participation rate was very poor registering 32.1% in 1980 and then it 
has increased marginally to 39.1 in 2001 including all forms of employment. The growth of 
formal employment has been less than one percent during the last two decades. This poses a 
question of sustainability of the growth. We need to look at the issue of anti-dumping strategy 
from this perspective.  
Since India stands on the top of the number of AD initiatives, one should look at its 
distribution over industries and resultant impact of trade and industrial dynamics. The Table 4 
lists AD initiations by products according to HS classifications. The highest number of AD 
initiations have been concentrated in Sectors VI (Products of the chemicals and allied 
industries), followed by Sector XV (Base Metals and Articles of Base Metals) , VII (Resins, 
Plastics and articles, Rubber & articles), XVI (Machinery and electrical equipment). Products 
of the chemicals and base metals account for more than 60% of total antidumping.  
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TABLE 4 
 Number of AD Initiatives by sectors in India during 1993-2010 
HS Code Product Names Number % 
Section I Live Animals, Animals Products 0 0.0 
Section II Vegetables Products 0 0.0 
Section III 
Animal or Vegetable Fats and Oils and their cleavage Products; 
Prepared Edible fats; animal or Vegetable waxes 
0 0.0 
Section IV 
Prepared Foodstuffs; Beverages, Spirits and Vinegar; Tobacco and 
Manufactured Tabacco substitutes 
8 1.5 
Section V Mineral Products 8 1.5 
Section VI Products of the Chemicals or Allied Industries 176 34.0 
Section VII Plastics and Articles thereof; Rubber and Articles Thereof 59 11.4 
Section VIII 
Raw Hides and Skins, Leather, Furskins and Articles thereof; saddlery 
and Harness; travel goods, Handbags and similar Containers; Articles 
of animal gut (other than silk-worm Gut) 
0 0.0 
Section IX 
Wood and Articles of Wood; Wood Charcoal; cork and articles or cork; 
Manufactures of Straw, of Esparto or of other Plaiting Materials; 
Basketware and Wickerwork 
0 0.0 
Section X 
Pulp of wood or of other Fibrous Cellulosic Material; Recovered 
(Waste and Scrap) Paper or Paperboard; Paper And Paperboard and 
articles thereof 
14 2.7 
Section XI Textile and Textile Articles 47 9.1 
Section XII 
Footwear, Headgear, Umbrellas, Sun Umbrellas, Walking-sticks, seat-
sticks, whips, Riding-crops and Parts thereof; Prepared Feathers and 
articles Made therewith; artificial Flowers; Articles of Human Hair 
2 0.4 
Section XIII 
Articles of Stone, Plaster, Cement, Asbestos, Mica or similar Materials; 
Ceramic Products; Glass and Glassware 
8 1.5 
Section XIV 
Natural or Cultured Pearls, Precious or Semi-Precious Stones, Precious 
Metals, Metals clad with Precious Metal, and articles thereof; Imitation 
Jewellery; Coin 
0 0.0 
Section XV Base Metals and Articles of Base Metal 137 26.5 
Section XVI 
Machinery and Mechanical Appliances; Electrical Equipment; Parts 
thereof; sound Recorders and Reproducers, Television Image and 
Sound Recorders and reproducers, Television Image and sound 
Recorders and Reproducers, and Parts and Accessories of such article 
54 10.4 
Section XVII Vehicles, Aircraft, Vessels and Associated Transport Equipment 0 0.0 
Section XVIII 
Optical, Photographic, Cinematographic, measuring, checking, 
precision, medical or surgical Instruments and apparatus; clocks and 
watches; musical instruments; part and accessories thereof 
3 0.6 
Section XIX Arms and Ammunition; Parts and Accessories thereof 0 0.0 
Section XX Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles 0 0.0 
Section XXI Works of art, Collectors' Pieces and Antiques 1 0.2 
Total  517 100.0 
Source: GAD IND-AD, World Bank 
Now, it is important to investigate the impact of AD initiative on trade flow.  At first, one 
should look at the Intra-industry trade share which will essentially report us the international 
competitiveness. IIT is the part of total trade in the product (exports and imports) that is not 
net trade, i.e.  
       (3) 
Where X is the value of exports of the products and M is the value of imports of the same 
products. For the same inter-industry and inter-country comparison, one needs to derive the 
index in relative terms. One way is to measure the relative importance of IIT, as a share of 
total trade:  
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      (4) 
The value of the index lies between 0 to 1. If it is 0, the intra-industry trade is assumed to be 
nil. If it is 1, intra-industry trade is assumed to be highest. The value of IIT share has been 
presented in Table 5. As one moves down, the industries would be seen as less AD-prone. It 
suggests that the industries in the 10 rows account for higher value of share as well as shows 
a general trend of rising intra-industry trade. In general, IIT share registers both rising and 
declining trend within six years from 1998-99 to 2003-04 for the AD prone 12 industries. 
Therefore, we cannot conclude that the international competition of these industries has 
declined (see Table 5). 
TABLE 5 
Intra-Industry Trade Share by commodities 
NIC Code 
 
1998-99 2003-04 
241 Basic chemicals 0.62371 0.863603 
242 Other chemical products 0.759175 0.657015 
271 Basic Iron & Steel 0.887778 0.651687 
251 Rubber products 0.626278 0.576279 
252 Plastic Products 0.664881 0.792334 
331 Medical appliances 0.335166 0.402372 
281 Structural metal products 0.644246 0.601712 
289 Other stream generators 0.644246 0.601712 
311 Electric Motor, generators and transformers 0.487525 0.363632 
291 General purpose machinery 0.404069 0.515835 
171 Spinning and weaving textiles 0.188081 0.368282 
Source: ASI, CSO 
One of the intension behind the AD initiatives has been to restrict import competition.  Let us 
now look at growth of imports and exports of the AD intensive industries. The data has been 
taken from Nicita and Olarreaga (2006) and the exponential growth rate has been calculated 
from the figures by using physical quantity of imports and exports. The imports including all 
commodities have grown at 15% per annum and the same from AD intensive (except three 
items) has increased at higher than this rate. So, AD has not made any significantly adverse 
effect on the import. The growth of imports from import-competing sector should be higher 
than the same for export competing sectors. Moreover, the growth of imports can be 
explained by the increase of demand or fall of import prices. The growth of unit value of 
imports has dropped for some commodities but increased for others. On an average, the unit 
value of AD intensive imports has declined while this has increased for all commodities 
during 1998-2004. But, none of them are statistically significant. Still one can infer that the 
unit value of imports under AD intensive category seems to be declining. This does mean that 
the consumer would be better off. Because many of those importable items are used as 
intermediate goods and hence it would not necessarily be reflected in the consumer price 
index. 
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TABLE 6 
Growth of imports during 1998-2005 
NIC Code Import Export Imp_UV 
241 2.46 15.3** 8.62 
242 9.89* 18.2** 0.02 
271 13.6* 27.4** 0.78 
251 27.9** 20.3** -16.03 
252 12.3* 15.4** 2.71 
331 39.1** 21.3* -7.46 
281 20.6 -4.7 -5.75 
289 18.3** -0.99 -7.22 
31 17.9** 19.8** 4.63 
291 19.9** 25.1** -5.45 
17 22.4** 17.6** -2.35 
Group Average 18.6 15.9 -2.5 
All commodities 15** 18.1** 2.6 
Source: Nicita and Olarreaga (2007) 
Let us now look at the price movement of AD intensive commodities items relative to the 
overall price indices (combining all commodities). The relative price of AD intensive 
commodities registers a rising trend during 1994-2010 for four categories - Base metals and 
articles, Products of the chemical and allied industries, Cement and Gypsum Products, 
Resins, plastics and articles; rubber and articles (see Table 7). The prices of machinery and 
electrical equipment as well as Textiles and articles have been, though lower than the overall 
price indices, shown increasing trends. Therefore, the consumer surplus would essentially be 
lower in the AD intensive commodities. 
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  TABLE 7 
Relative price compared to overall price by AD initiative sector 
Sector 
1
9
9
4
-9
5
 
1
9
9
9
-2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
0
-0
1
 
2
0
0
1
-0
2
 
2
0
0
2
-0
3
 
2
0
0
3
-0
4
 
2
0
0
4
-0
5
 
2
0
0
5
-0
6
 
2
0
0
6
-0
7
 
2
0
0
7
-0
8
 
2
0
0
8
-0
9
 
2
0
0
9
-1
0
 
2
0
1
0
-1
1
 
Base metals and 
articles 
0.99 0.91 0.89 0.87 0.87 1.00 1.08 1.11 1.13 1.16 1.22 1.07 1.06 
Products of the 
chemical and allied 
industries 
0.96 0.90 0.87 0.85 0.87 1.05 1.16 1.18 1.15 1.19 1.31 1.09 1.08 
Cement and Gypsum 
Products  
0.96 0.90 0.86 0.85 0.87 1.12 1.24 1.27 1.23 1.30 1.43 1.13 1.11 
Resins, plastics and 
articles; rubber and 
articles 
0.97 0.96 0.94 0.91 0.90 0.98 1.14 1.18 1.11 1.14 1.29 1.06 0.98 
Machinery and 
electrical equipment 
0.96 0.85 0.86 0.82 0.84 0.92 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.08 0.88 0.83 
Textiles and articles 0.88 0.89 0.84 0.82 0.79 0.88 0.96 0.94 0.72 0.72 0.68 0.93 0.99 
Paper, paperboard and 
articles 
1.12 1.01 1.01 1.00 0.94 0.94 0.92 1.00 1.26 1.22 1.06 1.03 0.99 
Articles of stone, 
plaster; ceramic prod.; 
glass 
1.13 1.10 1.13 1.12 1.07 1.05 1.04 1.08 1.23 1.15 1.05 0.97 0.92 
Mineral products 1.10 0.88 0.83 0.83 0.77 0.79 0.76 0.89 1.29 1.33 1.08 0.98 0.95 
ALL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Source: Monthly Bulletin, Reserve Bank of India 
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Let us now move on to see the FDI flow in the AD initiative sector. Recently, NCAER 
(2010) has compiled a detailed report on FDI flows to India. According to the report, the FDI 
flows have been still low and it is even less than two percent of total investment. FDI flows 
have been fluctuating substantially in all sectors but seem to be declining only in paper, paper 
board and articles. Otherwise, all the AD intensive sectors (e.g., products of chemicals and 
allied industries, cement products, base metal products and resins, plastics and rubber 
products, and machinery equipments), shown in first four columns in Table 8, register a 
rising trend on an average during 2000-2006. Mechanical and electrical equipments sector 
has been largest recipients of FDI.  It has been more than double in these four categories. It is 
clearer when the FDI flow has been presented in percentage shares. The FDI share in 
chemicals and allied industries has increased from 8.7% in 2000 to 21.9% in 2004 and then 
dropped to 10.7 in 2006. But, on an average it registers an increasing trend during this period. 
This is also true for other three AD intensive sectors. The flow in resigns, plastic and rubber 
products has been relative low in terms of percentage share but still rising in absolute term. 
The share of flow in machinery and electrical equipments sector has increased from 28.5% in 
2000 to sharply 44.2% in 2006. Therefore, AD initiative might have pushed up the FDI in 
these sectors. 
TABLE 8 
FDI by sector (real, at 1993-94 prices) 
Sector 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Products of the chemical and 
allied industries 114.7 129.9 125.0 82.2 293.8 138.0 301.8 
Cement and Gypsum Products  46.4 85.5 13.3 5.3 0.1 230.9 101.5 
Base metals and articles 11.1 23.6 33.3 22.2 130.3 84.4 101.8 
Resins, plastics and articles; 
rubber and articles 2.4 0.4 26.9 10.1 23.4 17.5 8.9 
Machinery and electrical 
equipment 376.0 537.0 684.6 375.4 566.5 734.7 1245.1 
Textiles and articles 1.2 2.8 26.6 10.1 20.7 40.3 56.9 
Paper, paperboard and articles 38.0 6.9 6.8 4.4 2.2 17.3 3.7 
Articles of stone, plaster; 
ceramic prod.; glass 22.5 6.9 26.2 3.8 19.0 48.2 23.0 
Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles 582.7 314.2 147.4 172.8 151.1 202.7 803.1 
Mineral products 70.7 239.4 375.8 89.6 83.0 32.0 125.7 
Group Total 1265.7 1346.5 1465.9 776.1 1290.0 1545.9 2771.5 
Source: NCAER Report (2010) 
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TABLE 9 
Distribution of FDI by AD initiative Sector 
Sector 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Products of the chemical and 
allied industries 8.7 9.3 7.8 10.0 21.9 8.2 10.7 
Cement and Gypsum Products  3.5 6.1 0.8 0.6 0.0 13.7 3.6 
Base metals and articles 0.8 1.7 2.1 2.7 9.7 5.0 3.6 
Resins, plastics and articles; 
rubber and articles 0.2 0.0 1.7 1.2 1.7 1.0 0.3 
Machinery and electrical 
equipment 28.5 38.4 43.0 45.5 42.2 43.7 44.2 
Textiles and articles 0.1 0.2 1.7 1.2 1.5 2.4 2.0 
Paper, paperboard and articles 2.9 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.2 1.0 0.1 
Articles of stone, plaster; ceramic 
prod.; glass 1.7 0.5 1.6 0.5 1.4 2.9 0.8 
Miscellaneous manufactured 
articles 44.2 22.5 9.3 21.0 11.3 12.1 28.5 
Mineral products 5.4 17.1 23.6 10.9 6.2 1.9 4.5 
Source: NCAER Report (2010) 
The growth of imports and FDI cannot be explained as in response to AD initiations, 
Because, these could grow simply because of income growth. Without controlling the income 
and demand effects, one cannot clearly infer the role of AD on imports and FDI. However, 
any change due to either imports or FDI must have implication on the competition and 
resultant mark-up of the commodities. We are now interesting to see the mark-up of the 
industries in AD intenstive industries. AD initiatives provide some market power to the 
existing domestic producers. At the same time, AD jumping FDI can also limit the power. It 
is now important task to derive the market power of the AD intensive industries compared to 
all industries. Using a standard production function, the market power can be easily derived 
without having price information (Abraham et al., 2007; Maiti, 2012). Assume that labour (L) 
and Capital (K) jointly determine output (Y) using Cobb-Douglas production function. With 
some manipulation, it can be presented into a form of regression equation such a way, one 
would be able to derive market power of the concerned industries for a given time period (see 
Appendix). So, our basic regression equation for i-th industry, j-th states and t-th years could 
be written as below:   
ijtijtijtijtijtijt uwBARkLERSR        (48) 
Where, 

 
 and 




1  
Where, )()( klskqSR L  , )( kqLER  , ))(1( klsBAR L  , SR is simply defined 
as Solow residuals and must be influenced by the market power of producers in one industry. 
It is expected that SR would rise with an increase of market power. The estimated coefficient 
of LER variable will account for the degree of the power. Here 
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)/1(1/)(   PMCp is the Lerner index. Since  and   are directly related, SR 
should rise with a rise of LER, if   is positive. Therefore,   is equal to the ratio of price to 
marginal cost. ijt
w
is the TFP and ijt
u
is the random disturbance term. SR could also be 
influenced by the bargaining power of workers in the industry and one needs to control this 
factor before estimating marketing power of the producers. The coefficient of BAR would 
essentially capture the bargaining power of the workers. Moreover, this expression is a bit 
different from the one which is used both in Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinshion and 
Petrin (2003).  However, they can be applied with a minor modification.  
The estimation of the parameters in the above equaltion would not be straight-forward. In 
principle, both pooled and fixed effect panel regressions can be run to estimate the 
parameters, but they are often criticised on endogenety ground. Firms usually observe a part 
of productivity before hand and hence adjust the factor of production accordingly. This raises 
the problem of simultaneity, and the residual term and the variable factor inputs seem to be 
correlated. Hence, it violates the basic requirement of Ordinary Least Square method. At first, 
Olley and Pakes (1996) raised these issues and offered alternative method of estimation. 
Then, Levinshion and Petrin (2003) revised this further. Olley Pakes (1996) developed a 
consistent semi-parametric estimator to fix the problem where they used firm level 
investment decision to proxy unobserved productivity shocks. Though Olley-Pakes approach 
has the clear advantage of easy implementation it also has a potential drawback in the cases 
where firms report zero investment. Due to the invertibility condition, investment proxy is 
valid only for non- zero investment. Pronounced adjustment costs force most firms in 
developing countries like India, Turkey, Columbia, Mexico and Indonesia to report zero 
investment costs. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) argue that intermediate inputs also adjust to 
productivity shocks and are more flexible than investment. The advantage of non-zero level 
of intermediate inputs also adds to the cause, because firms generally do not report zero level 
of intermediate input usage. Since our database includes three digits industry information, the 
present study can run both methods. We create dummy for those whose profit are negative or 
zero in order to run Olley-Pakes method. Moreover, we consider gross fixed capital 
formation in Olley-Pakes regressions and both material and fuel cost as proxies in Levinsohn-
Petrin regressions to deal with the endogeneity problem.  
We run (48) by using difference form so that fixed effects are eliminated easily. After 
running the regression, the mark-up (  ) has been estimated from the estimated coefficient of 
LER for respective industries. The figures are then presented in column 1 of Table 10. The 
overall mark-up of Indian industries has been 1.62 and it means that the mark-up of industrial 
products is on an average 1.62 times of marginal cost of production. Similarly, if we look at 
the value of estimated mark-up for AD-prone industries, all register more than one and 
reveals that they have sufficient market power. Interestingly, except for 242 and 289 the 
market power of other AD intensive industries are found to be lower than the overall mark-up 
of Indian industries. Therefore, one cannot infer that the imposition of AD yields a greater 
market power of AD intensive goods. Because, AD imposition would definitely keep market 
power of the existing domestic industries at the higher level, and at the same time, pushes up 
the FDI flow, leading to a decline of the same. So, the net effect would yield a moderate 
market power.  
Since entry and employment generation in the formal industrial sector have been most serious 
problem in the recent past, we should examine whether AD initiation has effectively created 
an entry barrier and thereby limited the employment generation. Annual average entry rate 
and employment growth have been respectively 1.24% and 3.20% during 1998-2005. Still, 
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except for four industry groups, the entry has been positive and growth rate of some of them 
shows a higher figure than the overall growth. Similarly, the employment growth of AD 
intensive industries has been positive (except three groups) and it is higher in six industry 
groups than the average.  Apart from the individual demand factor, AD initiation could have 
helped to promote employment though domestic entry and FDI flow.  
TABLE 10 
Producer’s Mark-up and Employment in AD intensive sectors in India 
 Mark-up Factory Workers 
Annual Growth 
(%), 1998-2007 
NIC Code 
1998-
2005 
1998 2007 1998 2007 Factory Workers 
241 1.09 3009 2922 151541 140368 -0.32 -0.82 
242 2.36* 7515 8209 343748 457571 1.03 3.68 
271 1.44* 3725 4098 324007 435950 1.11 3.84 
251 1.46 2012 2068 93491 103663 0.31 1.21 
252 1.71** 4522 6123 103288 172208 3.93 7.41 
331 1.44 696 737 28251 41529 0.65 5.22 
281 1.44 2361 2901 79021 126260 2.54 6.64 
289 1.76** 5518 6972 117144 247616 2.93 12.38 
311 1.61** 1293 1144 61923 73815 -1.28 2.13 
291 1.36 4323 4149 198127 165773 -0.45 -1.81 
171 1.53 10339 9047 1029018 952234 -1.39 -0.83 
Subgroup 
Total  
45313 48370 2529559 2916987 0.75 1.72 
Subgroup 
Average 
1.39 - - - - - - 
All 1.62 131706 146385 6364464 8198110 1.24 3.20 
Source: ASI, CSO 
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SECTION 7 
ANTI-DUMPING INITIATIVES IN INDIA 
Since the above-analysis was based on three-digit industry-level, firm level information 
would check robustness of the results. The database used for the purpose of analysis is 
CAPITALINE – we have used company level data for 39 firms in the chemical and 
petrochemical industry for the years 1997 – 2009. Our dataset constitutes an unbalanced 
panel with 149 observations.  
The CAPITALINE dataset is beset with some serious problems  
 it is not exhaustive in the sense that only a small subset of firms within an industry 
report their variables every year and the sample of such firms doing so is also smaller 
than the PROWESS database that reports firm-level data. 
  it is not able to provide balanced panel information. These are very large number of 
missing observations in the data used for analysis. 
Notwithstanding these limitations we make an attempt to capture the disaggregated company-
level details to draw meaningful patterns and useful insights into firm dynamics as a result of 
AD actions. 
Thus, a 13 year time-period with 39 firms in the chemical industry have been included in our 
panel data analysis to assess the impact of constructed AD variables (dummies) on the 
Chemicals & Petrochemical Industries. The reason for selecting Chemicals and 
Petrochemical Industry was because it was the dominant industry in which the largest number 
of AD duties had been levied. Moreover, the industry has performed excellent growth during 
last two decades in India. According to a report published by Gupta and Golder (2010) on 
R&D, it registers a higher figure than European firms.  
Anti-Dumping Variables 
We have constructed anti-dumping (AD) variables to assess the impact of AD initiations on 
firm behavior. AD takes values from 0 to 6 – it captures the cumulative time-effect of AD 
initiation(s) by firm(s) – those firms in the industry who do not get AD protection are given 
the value 0 and those who get protection get non-zero values, cumulating overtime, taking 
value 1 in the year of initiation, 2 in the year when the next AD initiation is filed and so on. 
WPI Series (base 1993-94) for chemicals have been used as deflator for the calculation of 
real values.  
Methodology: 
The panel-regressions are run and we use the method of Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data 
estimation:  
itititit uXYY    1  
Real imports: Nominal total imports = Import of raw materials - CIF + Import of stores & 
spares + Import of finished goods + Other imports. Real Imports = Nominal total imports / 
WPI Series (base 1993-94) for chemicals. When we regression AD on real imports, we find 
that there exists a positive and significant relation between AD filings and the level of real 
imports of the industry filing for AD. This is observed after controlling for FDI and real 
investment respectively. So, AD initiation does not affect the import.  
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TABLE 11 
 Dependent Variable 
Independent Variables  ln Real Imports  FDI R&D TFP 
AD 0.285*** 0.03  0.033 0.191 
Note: ***represents significant at 5% level; Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation (GMM estimation 
method)  
Let us move on to FDI flow. The variable taken as a proxy for FDI is % Equity Holding 
(Foreign (Promoter & Group) in the firm in a given year. Our regression results show that 
there exists a positive and insignificant impact of AD on FDI in the industry. One of the 
reasons for not getting significant result is that the low number of observations and it carries a 
lot of missing value over the years.  
Similar results have also been found when R&D
1
 and TFP have been regressed.  
Research & Development is the total R&D expenditure as percentage of net turnover (%) 
Total factor Productivity (TFP) has been derived from this formula. We use the following 
variables to compute the TFP of each firm in each year: 
      Then, we compute the Gross Value Added (GVA) as:  
             TFP = ln GVA – (share of labor)* ln L – (share of capital)* lnK 
      where share of labor = Employee Cost/ GVA  
We find positive but insignificant impact of AD on R&D and TFP. So, one can firmly 
confirm that AD has not been conducive for R&D and productivity growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Usually it is assumed that the competition increases the incentives for R&D and thereby raises the productivity 
growth. At the same, it should be remember that too much could be harmful. Aghion et al. (2007) established an 
inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation. 
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SECTION 8 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Consecutive multilateral negotiations at the level of the WTO have resulted in the reduction 
of import tariffs, but not much initiative has been directed toward non-tariff barriers. 
Moreover, recent trends in the usage of unfair trade laws indicate that they are being used 
more frequently, by more countries, and against more products. Antidumping (henceforth, 
AD) is the most popular trade defense instrument, now being increasingly used by countries 
to protect their producers from supposedly unfair competition. Theoretically, it is shown that 
strategic use of anti-dumping initiative could be beneficiation for the domestic by drawing 
foreign direct investment. But, this depends on the labour market conditions within the 
economy. 
India files the largest number of AD initiations in the world in the recent past and there is a 
large concentration of these initiations and measures in certain industries over some others- 
the most important of which is the chemicals and petrochemicals industries. Almost 50% of 
AD initiatives have gone against China and other neighbouring countries. In this paper, we 
made a modest attempt to study the impact of AD filings by firms. We have not found 
notable impact of AD initiatives on imports. It might have positive impact on FDI. Even then 
the AD intensive industries carry higher price with substantial market-power. Because, FDI 
flows have been still very low. Firm level study also shows modest impact of AD on the 
chemical industry on certain variables of interest. Notwithstanding the data problems, we, 
however, find that AD in general does not act adversely on imports, R&D and TFP of the 
chemical industry. Rather, the effect of AD on FDI seems to be positive. 
From a policy point of view, however, one needs to look at the stupendous surge in AD 
initiations with some caution. It is true that AD may enhance the protection received by the 
domestic industry and increase the latter‟s profits. Indiscriminate use of such protective 
instruments engenders perverse incentives for domestic producers to undertake lesser and 
lesser innovations and R&D in their production trajectories.  
Policy Suggestions:  
• In general, AD is anti-competitive effect and has distortions on consumer. But, 
strategic use of such initiative could beneficial for the domestic economy by drawing 
foreign direct investment in some situations.  
• Any unfair policy on competition should not be supported and it must have other 
retaliation effect on federal democratic country like India. For example, A regional 
government might seek for protection of local producers on similar analogy. 
• AD provides protection to the small group of industries in the formal sector. More 
than 90% industries in the informal sector are almost out of this coverage. Even if, the 
laws do not preclude them from AD petition, the minimum requirements for filling 
cannot be fulfilled due to lack of their organizational networks. 
• Injury investigation seems to be arbitrary and un-scientific. Investigation process of 
injury calculation does not account for environmental damage, consumer surplus and 
workers welfare.  
• The government should clearly spell out the methods of injury calculation. Although 
it could vary case to case, but there has to have common minimum uniform methods 
of injury calculations in order to avoid arbitrariness.  
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• Since a large number of AD initiatives have been against China, it definitely raises an 
issue of fair competition. China still does not follow market rule in various aspects of 
economic relation and the fair competition is really an issue when a country faces a 
cheaper commodity originated from non-competitive environment. Therefore, injury 
calculation should also count the cost of production in the foreign country before 
imposing AD duties. AD laws cannot be withdrawn fully. Rather the use of such 
restrictions should be limited.  However, safeguard policy is used before considering 
AD initiation.  
• Thus, the government needs to strike a balance between protecting the interests of the 
domestic producers on one hand and encouraging indiscriminate initiations of AD 
filings to appease some pressure groups and lobbies and create vested interests. Too 
much of such protection, might go against the economic interest of the nation and 
dampen the economy‟s optimistic and dynamic growth phenomenon 
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APPENDIX 
A standard benchmark model with two production factors, labour and capital, is widely used 
in the literature. Let us consider a production function where value added ijt
Q
 of firm i in j-th 
region and year t is produced using two inputs, namely labour L and capital K. Ignoring 
subscript, it can be written as follows : 
),( KLAFQ         (1) 
If the production function is homogeneous of degree 1  for all input factors, the returns to 
scale would be 1 . It would then exhibit respectively decreasing (  < 0 ), constant (  = 0 
) or increasing (  > 0 ) returns to scale. By taking a total differential of (1) and logarithmic 
values we get: 
akklkq L   )()(        (2) 
The left-hand expression in (2) represents the change in output-capital ratio minus the 
product of labour elasticity and change in labour capital ratio. This essentially captures the 
residual growth which depends on capital growth explaining returns to scale ( k ) and 
unexplained random term ( )a . In practice, it is really difficult to estimate the factor elasticity 
and hence factor share is used as proxy.  
Perfect Competition in both Product and Factor Markets 
Let us assume that the perfect competition prevails both in product and labour market. Under 
such situation, the wage is paid according to their value of marginal production, 
i.e., LVMPw . The LVMP is further the product of market price of output and marginal 
product of labour, i.e., LMPPw . . Now, re-arranging and substituting the terms, we get 
that LL s . In other word, the factor elasticity is exactly equal to the factor share only when 
the prefect competition prevails both in the product and labour market. Then, we get  
akklskq L  )()(        (3) 
Where )()( klskqSR L  . It is really difficult to find out a true perfectly competitive 
market in practice, particularly in organised industrial sector.  
3.2 Imperfect Product Market   
Let us assume that the product market is non-competitive. Then the price would be higher 
than that of competitive market by the degree of mark-up on the marginal cost (i.e., 
competitive price) and the wage is paid according to their marginal revenue product, i.e., 
LMRPw   and the LMRP is the product of marginal revenue and marginal physical product, 
i.e., LL MPPMRMRP . where PMCMR  . If MCP / or mark-up levied on the top of 
marginal cost for one unit of production and Ls  is the cost share of labour, the labour 
elasticity is the product of mark-up and the labour share, i.e., LL s  . Therefore, the labour 
share would be lower than the earlier one and the residual growth would be higher. 
Assuming   1KL  and by substituting them in (2), we get  
akkqklskq L )1()()()(         (4) 
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Or, akLERSR )1(   , where )( kqLER  . )/1(1/)(   PMCp is the 
Lerner index. Since  and   are directly related, SR should rise with a rise of LER, if   is 
positive. Now, we can easily run the regression to get the parameters of market power and 
productivity growth, without using any price information. 
3.3 Imperfect Product and Labour Markets 
If the trade union determines wage in the labour market, it must be higher than the 
competitive one and the labour share would be different from its elasticity. Let us assume that 
the product market imperfection exists as before and an union works in the labour market 
now.  
Let us assume that L is the total workers available in the economy, 0
w
is the alternative wage 
for workers outside the firm and  is the bargaining power of the union, the wage can be 
derived from the following Nash bargaining equation, 
  1, )())((max wLPQwLwLLLw aaLw      (5) 
Solving (5) with respect to w and L, we can derive with some manipulation 
)1/()1(   LLL ss        (6) 
It is interesting to note that in the presence of trade union the labour elasticity would consist 
of an additional term in order to relate with factor share. The first term in the right-hand side 
in (6) is similar to the previous one because of the product market imperfection only and the 
second term captures additional rent drawn from the surplus by the union. Higher the  , the 
higher would be wage bills and the labour share. In other words, in the presence of labour 
union, SR will be lower with the higher wage rent. This additional term should essentially be 
brought into the regression equation and combining (4) and (6), we find that  
aklskkqklskq LL )1())(1(
1
)()()( 




 


  (7) 
Or,
aBARkLERSL )1(
1





 


,where , ))(1( klsBAR L   and it rises if either 
the labour share or employment increase. The expression (7) is our basic equation to be used 
in the further analysis and allows us to estimate market and union bargaining power 
simultaneously without the information on market price and the alternative wage.  
Econometric Method 
Following the expression (7), our basic regression equation for i-th industry, j-th states and t-
th years could be written as below:   
ijtijtijtijtijtijt uwBARkLERSR        (8) 
Where, 

 
 and 




1  
Where, ijt
w
is the modified TFP and ijt
u
is the random disturbance term. We define that the 
modified total factor productivity will be free from all market imperfections and one can 
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easily estimate the extent of market distortions. Moreover, this expression is a bit different 
from the one which is used both in Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinshion and Petrin (2003).  
However, they can be applies with a minor modification.  
The estimation procedure of productivity growth using both approaches involves two steps to 
deal with the simultaneity problem and market distortions. In (8), ijt

is the observed part and 
ijtu is the random disturbance term. The expectation of future realisation of productivity 
growth (i.e., observed term) increases in its contemporaneous values of stock (log-capital) 
and proxy variables (material costs and fuels in Levinshion-Petrin method and gross capital 
formation in Olley-Pakes method, denoted as ijt
m
). In other words, an unknown function for 
optimal decision of ijt
m
 can be written as 
),( ijtijttijt kwmm  . Inverting this function, we write 
further as
),( ijtijttijt kmhw  and therefore, 
),( ijtijttijtijt kmhk   where third order polynomials 
in m and k including constant term have been used to define this unknown function. Denoting 
the estimated variables as ijt

~
and substituting this into (8), we find 
ijtijtijtijtijt uBERLERSR  
~
       (9) 
Note that this equation is slightly different from the original forms used in both approaches. 
At first stage, this equation will be estimated and in order to go to the second stage, we define 
another variable as ijtijtijtijt
BARLERSRV  ˆˆ 
. Alternatively, this equation can be written 
as follows:  
ijtijtijtijtijtijtijt ukgkV    )
~
( 11       (10) 
Again, g appears to be an unknown function and is approximated to third order polynomials 
for the estimation of this equation. This would be bit more cumbersome than the first-stage 
estimation and the estimated ijt

 provides our modified figures of TFP. We have bootstrapped 
the regressions by 250 times.  
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